



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## ILLUSTRATING COMMERCIAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA

### INTRODUCTORY NOTE

INTERCOURSE between England and Russia began with the chance "discovery" of the Muscovite Empire in the middle of the sixteenth century by the Willoughby-Chancellor expedition. The English merchants at once realised the commercial possibilities of the accident that had driven the explorers upon the inhospitable shores of the White Sea. The Muscovy or Russia Company was at once organised, and a regular trade viâ Archangel was established. For over a century and a half relations were confined to purely commercial affairs, and were, except during the Commonwealth and Protectorate, uniformly friendly. Peter the Great inherited these traditions of friendship, but his ambitious policy of expansion Westwards brought him into conflict with the Continental interests of our first two Georges, and diplomatic relations were for a time suspended. When these were resumed the two Governments entered into closer relationships, cemented by a commercial treaty and several treaties of alliance, notably in 1742 and 1755.

With brief intervals England and Russia remained

friendly until the accession of Nicholas I. That monarch's thinly disguised designs upon Turkey, and the continual advance of Russia in Central Asia towards the frontiers of India, rendered her policy suspect in England throughout the nineteenth century. Only when both Empires were confronted by the German menace did they abandon what had become an almost habitual antagonism, and, by a series of agreements in 1907 removed all sources of irritation and misunderstanding, and so ultimately prepared the way for the alliance of 1914.

The sources, both printed and manuscript, for an exhaustive treatment of the subject of this book are enormous, and have scarcely attracted the attention of historians. This little collection does not pretend to take the place of a history of Anglo-Russian relations, nor can it even claim to have illustrated all the most important episodes of the three and a half centuries which it traverses. The task of selection from such a vast quantity of material has been somewhat difficult, and exigencies of space have compelled me to omit or curtail many interesting and illuminating *pièces justificatives*. Among those omitted are such well-known diplomatic instruments as those relating to the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1801, the Treaty of Paris of 1856, etc. These, however, are fairly accessible, and are, moreover, generally described in all standard works and textbooks on modern European history.

Up to the nineteenth century my main source has been the letters that passed between the sovereigns, and the despatches and correspondence of the British representatives at the Court of St. Petersburg. For the most recent events I have drawn chiefly upon official papers. Meagre as is the collection, I hope it will prove useful to



students, and stimulate further research in an almost unworked field of international history. The brief bibliography will, I trust, enable the beginner to thread his way through the tangled maze of Russian story, and enable him to catch a glimpse of the forces that brought about the downfall of the world's greatest land Empire.

I have to acknowledge the kind permission to reprint two extracts from works published by the Hakluyt Society. In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to one of the editors of the series, Dr. Caroline A. J. Skeel, for her patience and kindness, as well as for many valuable hints and suggestions.

A. WEINER.

*September, 1919.*

## A.—EARLY COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE

### I

[After the Willoughby-Chancellor expedition had “discovered” Russia, a company for trading with that country through Archangel was organised. The first privileges were obtained in 1555 from Ivan IV. (1533-84) the Terrible. Hakluyt (ed. 1903), ii. 297-303.]

#### *Extract.*

John Vasilivich, by the grace of God Emperor of Russia etc. To all people that shall see, rede, heare or understand these presents, greeting. . . . Know ye therefore, that we of our grace speciall etc., and by these presents for us, our heires and successours, do give and grant as much as in us is and lieth, unto Sebastian Cabota, Governour, Sir Geo. Barnes Knt., etc., Consuls: Sir John Gresham etc., assistants, and to the communaltie [of merchants adventurers for discovery of lands, etc.], and to their successours for ever, and to the successours of everie of them, these articles, graunts, immunities, franchises, liberties and privileges, and every of them hereafter following, expressed and declared.

1. First, we for us etc., do by these presents give and graunt free licence, facultie, authority and power unto the

said Governour etc., and communalty of the said fellowship etc., that all and singular the marchants of the same company, their agents etc., may at all times hereafter for ever more surely, freely and safely with their shippes, merchandizes, goods and things whatsoever saile, come and enter into all and singular our lands, countries, etc., by sea, land or fresh waters, and there tary, abide and sojourn, and buy, sell, barter, and change all kind of merchandizes with al maner of marchants and people, of whatsoever nation, rite etc. . . . and exercise all kinds of merchandizes in our Empire and dominions, and every part thereof freely and quietly without any restraint, impeachment, price, exaction, prest, straight custome, toll, imposition, or subsidie to be demanded, taxed, or paid, or at any time hereafter to be demanded, taxed, set, levied or inferred upon them or any of them, or upon their goods, ships etc., so that they shall not need any other safe conduct or licence generall, ne speciall of us, our heires and successours, neither shall be bound to aske any safe conduct or licence in any of the aforesaid places subject unto us.

2. Item, we give and graunt to the said marchants this power and liberty, that they, ne any of them, ne their goods, wares etc., shal be by any meanes within our dominions, landes etc., or other place or places of our jurisdiction, at any time heereafter attached, staied, arrested ne disturbed for anie debt, duetie or other thing, for the which they be not principall debtors or sureties, ne also, for any offence or trespasse committed, or that shall be committed, but only for such as they or any of them shall actually commit, and the same offences (if any such happen), shall bee by us onely heard and determined.

4. Item, we give and graunt unto the saide marchants and their successours, that such person as is, or shalbe commended unto us, our heires and successours by the Governour, Consuls and assistants of the said fellowship . . . may and shal have ful power and authoritie to governe and rule all Englishmen that have had, or shall have accesse, or repaire in or to this said Empire and jurisdictions, or any part thereof, and shal and may minister unto them, and every of them good justice in all their causes, plaints etc. and make such actes, and ordinances, as he so commended with his assistants shall thinke good and meete for the good order, government and rule of the said marchants etc. . . . and to set and levie upon all, and every Englishmen, offender or offenders of such their acts or ordinances made, and to be made, penalties and mulets by fine or imprisonment.

6. Item, we promise unto the saide marchants, and their successours upon their request to exhibite and doe unto them good, exact and favourable justice, with expedition in all their causes, and that when they or any of them shall have accesse, or come to or before any of our justices, for any their plaints mooved, and to be mooved betweene any our subjects or other stranger, and them, or any of them, that then they shalbe first and forthwith heard, as soon as the party which they shal find before our justices, shalbe depeached, which party being heard forthwith, and assoone as may be, the said English marchants shall be ridde and dispatched; And if any action shall be moved by or against any of the said marchants being absent out of our saide empire and dominions, then such marchants may be substituted by attorney in all and singular his causes to be followed as need shall require, and as shall seeme to him expedient.

7. Item, we graunt and promise to the saide marchants, and to their successours, that if the same marchants or any of them shall be wounded, or (which God forbid) slaine in any part or place of our Empire and dominions, then good information thereof given, wee and our justices and other officers shall execute due correction and punishment without delay, according to the exigence of the case ; so that it shall bee an example to all other not to commit the like. And if it shall chaunce the factors, servants, or ministers of the saide marchants or any of them to trespasse or offende, whereby they or any of them shall incurre the danger of death or punishment, the goods, wares etc. of their masters shall not therefore bee forfeited etc. by any meanes by us, our heires or successours, or by any our officers etc. but shall remaine to their use, franke, free and discharged from all punishment and losse.

8. Item, we graunt that if any of the English nation be arrested for any debt, he shal not be laid in prison, so farre as he can put in sufficient suretie and pawne : . . .

9. Moreover, wee give, graunt and promise to the saide marchants, that if any of their ships or other vessels shall be spoyled, robbed, or damnified in sayling, anekoring or returning to or from our saide empires and dominions, or any part thereof, by any pirats, marchants, or other person, whatsoever hee or they bee, that then and in such case, wee will doe all that in us is to cause restitution, reparation, and satisfaction to bee duely made to the said English marchants by our letters and otherwise, as shall stand with our honour, and be consonant to equitie and justice.

[NOTE.—These privileges were renewed and extended in 1567, and included the right to trade with countries beyond the Caspian.]

## II

[Articles for a league of amity between Queen Elizabeth and the "mightie prince John Baisliwich [Ivan IV.], King and Great Duke of all Russia," etc. G. Tolstoy: "The First Forty Years of Intercourse between England and Russia," 74-78. 1569.]

*Extract.*

1. Whereas it hath been requested of her majesty on the behalf of the said right high and mightie Prince etc. John Basilwich, King and great Duke of all Russia, and that there might be a perpetuall amity betweene her majesty and the said Duke. It is accorded on her majesty's part there shall be a perpetuall perfect and sounde amity between her said Highnes and the said Duke and that every of them shall use all other Princes that are friends to eyther of them both, with good offis of friendshippe: and if any of them shalbe iniuried by any other Prince, uppon significacon made thereof by the party iniuried and the justice of his cause made manifest the other party shall in most earnest sort and without unnecessary delayes require the Prince that did the injury to desist from further offence and to returne to honorable condicions of peace according to the laws of Almighty God and the rules of iustice that ought to be betweene Princes that professe Christianity, which if the Prince so offending shall wilfully and against reason peremptorily refuse to do that then the Prince confederate after such refusall to his request shall in no wyse continew amity with the Prince so refusing but shall ayd the other Prince confederate that shalbe so iniuried to withstand the wrong don to his confederate.

2. Item, where it is requested by the said . . . prince that the said amity be offensive and defensive, so that the frends to the one may be taken and reputed frends to the other and the enemyes to the one the enemyes to the other. It is fully accorded and agreed on her majesty's behalf as in the former article appeareth. . . .

5. Her majesty is content and agreeth that uppon knowledge given of the parties being artificers and handycraftsmen that shall be content to depart to the said Duke's service, the same shalbe licensed so to do if they be not already lawfully impressed by bonde or otherwyse into any other especiall service within their native country. . . .

7. It is accorded on her majesty's part that it shalbe lawfull for all and every the marchants which are naturall borne subjects of eyther prince to bringe in and carry out all marchandises out of eyther their dominions and countries in lyke sort as at this day they lawfully do or may bring or carry out from or into any other countries of any other king with whom her majesty is in amity, so it be not with offence of priviledge graunted by eyther Prince, and that it be without coulloring the goods of any borne subject of any other Prince, on the only payne of confiscacon of the goods so to be coloured and without using factors or ministers of other nacon, and that neyther prince shall take away part of such marchandise from any marchant against his or their will, but in case where eyther of the princes shall have manifest neede to buy the same for the private use of the said prince about his person, or for his householde and in these cases that ready money at reasonable prices be paid to the marchant or owner.

8. Item where it is requested by the said right high and mightie prince that the said marchants on both partes

may salfly sojourne abyde tary and remayne (and have houses for theire necessary residence and warehouses for theire marchandises).

It is on her majesty's behalf agreed and accorded that the said marchants be his naturall borne subjects (of eyther Prince and that they observe the civill lawes of the countries where they remaine).

9. It is on her majesty's part required that this treaty or any part thereof shall not be drawn construed or taken to the diminucon or prejudice of anie priviledge heretofore graunted by the said right high and mightie Prince to her majesty's subjects and that the said priviledge and every clause and article thereof be from henceforth inviolably kept and observed and maintayned by the said right high and mightie Prince his heires and successors especially the article that excludeth all strangers from trafficque in his dominions without her use to lycence anything in this treaty or other things notwithstanding.

10. Lastly where it is requested that this league may be mutually confirmed by ambassadors sent from the one to the other and by others and seales of the one and the other.

It is on her majesty's part accorded so that convenient tyme be allowed in respect of the long and doubtful passage by sea for the ambassador to be sent forth at good purpose.

[NOTE.—These articles were, with the exception of a few words, identical with "Articles and Answers for the League betwixte Hir Ma-te and the greate Duke of Muscovie" renewed in May, 1582 (Tolstoy, 197-8), evidently in reply to repeated complaints of Ivan that his requests for an alliance had been ignored.]



## III

[Queen Elizabeth to the Emperor of Russia (Tolstoy, *ib.*, 96-98, May 18, 1570).]

When wee have by other our lettres delivered to your highness ambassadour the noble person Andrew Gregoriwiche Saviena made aunswere to the greatest part of such messages and lettres as the said ambassador declared and brought to us, wee have thought good in some secreite manner to send your highnes for a manifest and certaine token of our good will to your highnes estate and suertye: this our secret lettre whereunto none are privie besides our selfe, but our most secreite counsell, wee doe so regard the suertie of you the Emperour and great Duke, as wee offer that yf at anie time it so mishappe that you L. [*sic*] our brother Emperour and great Duke, bee by anie casuall chaunce either of secrite conspiracie or outward hostillite driven to change your countries and shall like to repaire into our kingdome and dominions, with the noble empresse your wife and youre deare children the princes, wee shall with such honors and curtesies receive and intreate your highnes then, as shall become so great a prince and shall earnestlie endeavour to make all thinges fall out accordinge to your majestie's desire, to the free and quiett breedinge of your highness life, with all those whom you shall bringe with you: and that it maie be lawfull for you the Emperour and great Duke to use your Christian religion in such sorte, as it shall like you: for nether meane wee to attempt anie thinge to offend either your ma-tie or anie of your people nor intermeddle anie waies with your highnes faith and religion, nor yet to severre your highness hous-

hold from you or to suffer anie of yours to be taken from you by violence.

Besides wee shall appointe you the Emperor and great Duke a place in our kingdome fitt upon your owne charge, as long as ye shall like to remaine with us. . . .

This wee promise by virtue of these our lettres and by the word of a Christian Prince, in witness wherof and for the further fortification of this our lettre, wee Queen Elizabeth doe subscribe this with our owne hand in the presence of these our nobles and counsellors.

#### IV

[Extract from notes by Michael Lock, one of the agents of the Russia Company, printed in "Russia at the Close of the Sixteenth Century." Ed. E. A. Bond, Hakluyt Society, 1856. Introduction, pp. xiii-xiv. 1575.]

The naturall comodities of the countries on all those sea-coasts are in abundance of fysshe of dyvers kynds, salte, trayne oylle, buffe hydes, cowhydes, tallow, furies of all kynds, iron, pitche, tarre, shipmasts and tymber, hempe, cables and ropes for shippes and other marchandise. . . . The naturall comodities of those uplande countries are thies: in the weste parte flax, linnen, yarne, hempe, cables, and ropes for shippes, tallow, cowhydes, pavynstones, and other marchandise; in the northe parts the comodities are before specified on the sea coasts; in the east parts are tallow, cowhydes, waxe, hempe, buffe hydes, furies, wool, tarre, shipmasts, timber, soap, ashes, and other marchandise; and in the sowthe parts is no traffyke of marchaundize but onely at Awstracan, whiche is there of exceeding great importaunce, for the comodities of Percia, which are silks of all sorts, and many druggs and other good comoudities; the rest of

that way is desolaite by reason of the Tartars and Cheremissins and Crymes inhabiting uppon the rever Volga, on bothe the sydes from Rezan and Cassan southwards to Awstracan, which Tartars are barbarowse and fyilde dwellers and in contenewal warres and spoyles.

The naturall comodities of England are most acceptable comodities to Russia and Mosehovia, whiche are wollen clothies and carseys and cottons, all redie dressed to the wearing, lead redie wrowght to laye on theare howses, tynne redye wrowght into pewtter vessell, and copper; and the moste of the same comodities are also moste acceptable to Percia. And also many other comodities of other countries are also acceptable in those countries of Russia and Mosehovia; to say clothe of golde, clothe of silke, jewells, spyces, and many other things of handy wowrk necessarye for apparrell of the bodye and for furnytüre of howsolde, all whiche thinges wolde passe throwghe the hands of Englishe marchants, whereby they might gather greate welthe to serve there owne prence and countrie at there neade.

Throughe an assuryd amytye betwene the prence of England and the prence of Russia wolde be settled a trade of marchandise of soche importance for the benefyte of England as never haith beane by anye one trade. . . .

Towehinge the state of the prence of Russia, Evan Basilvis, nowe rainginge, yt is said by credable report of somme which have seane moche thereof, that he is the most rytche prynce of treasour that lyvethe this day on earthe, except the Turk. . . . And for his owen parson, he hath bynne a noble warryor and greate conquerowre all his lyeffe tyme, whearby he may be thowght able to deffend his owen countrie, and to annoye his enneme, and to maynetane the

amytye that he doth promies to undertack. And yt may well be judged that he desirethe the amytie with England rather than with anye other lands, by eawse he well understandethe the seituation thereof be free frome dainger of all other prences; the comodities and welthe thereof so apt for mutuall traffyke with his countries; the justice and peaceable Governement thereof so good; and the naturall vertew of the Quenes Majestie nowe rainginge moveth him rather to joyne in amytye with hir Majestie than with anye other prence; for the saiftie of his own parson, and cheiflie for the refuge of his children after his death, yf anye adversytie should happen to them in his owen lande, as with his owen mowth he haith said. Thiese things considered, yt may be thowght he wolde be a good help unto England againste the kings of Denmark and Swethen and other esterne prences, yf they wolde make anye quarrel against this realme.

## V

[Extract from letter of Queen Elizabeth to Czar Theodore, August, 1590, (Tolstoy, 373-381).]

But we, alwaies preferringe the observation of brotherly love and frendshippe professed between us . . . contynewally permyttinge our subjects to transport into your kingdomes powder, saltpeter, brimstone, copper, leade, tynn, silver, gold, and suche lycke; which your father, of famous memory, did take himself greatlie beholdinge unto us for, althought nowe not so acknowledged of you, for that it stoed him in more steed in the time of his majestie's famous conquests. His highness accompted of us alwaies, althought a far neyghtbour yet a nere and a sure frend, as

by proof did apere. For the King of Swethia often anoyeinge the passadge by sea towards the Narve, yerly his ships of warr robbinge and spoilinge the Lubeckers, Danes, Frenchmen, Hollanders, etc., your said father, of famous memory, desyred us that we should send our princely ships of warr to remedye the spoyle that the Swethian made in the eastern seas; which we willingly graunted unto, and sent certain of our warlycke ships accompanied with other of our merchants apoynted for the purpose; fought with the wholle flete of the enymes princepall ships, soncke dyvers, spoyled the most part of the rest, and reserved some 150 of the principall actors, which our subjects brought and presented to your father, of famous memory . . . at the Narve, when then was execution done upon them.\* By this means the Swethian ships durst not come forth, and as longe as our shippes used those seas, the passadge was cleared and great trafique was at the Narve by all nations in quiet tyme.

The trewth and present memory of these things will manifest yt self; which if they were not yet in regester as a terrour with the Swethian, Dane, Lubecker, etc., they would not feare to attempt the lycke in the North Seas. Yet do we forbid none to come peaceably by weye of trafique into your kingdoms, althought wee have some reasone therunto, for that our subjects were the first founders of that passadge with lose of many a man's life and goods, and the mayntenance therof to this day; and we thinke that no nation whatsoever will presume to pass the seas of purpose, against our princely favour. We vaunt not of these things, nether of them as threats, but to helpe your princely memorie to consider that your brotherlye

\* The events here referred to occurred in 1570.

love towards us is not such as our watchfulle friendships towards you have deserved ; nether cane your ma-ty chardge our princelie hs. with any one such discortesy or cause of breach of brotherlye amytey. But your hs. may perceave that we have hitherto carried a constant care for the preservation therof—and therefore we do requier that as your ma-ty dothe tendar the preservation of your owne honour, so maye ther not be cause geven to impeache our princely dignytey.

## VI

[De Intercursu Mercandis arum cum Imperatore Russiæ (Fœdera, ed. 1715, xvii pp. 504-507. June 16, 1623).]

[Articles of a perpetuall League of Amity and Alliance, entercourse and commerce accorded and agreed upon betweene the most high and mighty princes James, by the grace of God, Kinge of Great Brittain etc. and the greate Lord Emperour and great Duke, Michall Pheodorwich, by the same Grace, of all Russia etc. etc. . . .]

*Extract.*

It is further concluded, that neither of the said renowned princes shall ayd or assist the other's enemy, which at this present is or hereafter may be, with men of warre munition victualls or other such like materiall or provisions for the warr, nor shall suffer anie armies of souldiers from other princes' dominions to be conveied through his kingdomes and dominions against his said confederate, but on the other side shall seeke to turn awaie that which might stretch to the enemies purpose, and to avoide divert impeache all hurtfull practizes that might anie waie arise or happen to his said confederate.

It is also agreed betweene the said renowned princes, that if hereafter there happen anie question of warr to arise against the one or the other, hee that shall suspect such warr shall advertise his confederate thereof in good tyme, and as much as in hym lyeth shall use all good indeavours by his advice and mediation to lay down by some friendly accorde such differences and questions out of which any warr might happen to arise or proceede, soe as the chardge of anie such mediation may reflecte uppon the partie that shall require it.

It is likewise provided by vertue of this Alyance, that if in case anie such difference should break out into open warr, and cannot be laid down with amitie and friendshipp, then the one and th'other shall suffer his confederate to make computent levies of hired soldiers within their kingdomes, and notwithstanding all generall prohibitions to the contrarie, shall have good leave at all tymes by their agent and servants to buy upp all manner of needefull provisions for the warres, and victualls, armor, munition, ordinance, artillerie, or other such materialls for the warr, what the one or the other desireth or may have neede of, and to transporte the same awaie without lett or interruption as farr as the same may reasonable stand with the commoditie of that prince's state in whose kingdomes respectively these leavies and provisions are to be made.

In case also if anie such warr to be raised, or invasion to be made, the confederates shall not permitt the enemie to make leavies of souldiers, or take upp any manner of warlike munition whatsoever within their kingdomes and domynions to the prejudice of either of the confederates respectively. . . .

If it shall happen that anie warr be hereafter raised uppon

either of theis renouned princes, wherein the one and the other be willinge to interpose themselves, it shall not be lawfull either for the one or the other to deale or handle with each others enemye concerninge anie peace or successe of armes, without expresse consent of such partie. . . .

## VII

[Negotiations between Charles II. and the Tsar, Alexis Michaelovitch, 1645-1676. The Tsar had advanced King Charles money during his exile and had apparently cancelled the privileges of the Russia Company at his instigation as a blow to the Government of the Protector. M. G., "A Relation of Three Embassies from His Sacred Majestie, Charles II., to the Great Duke of Muscovie etc." 1669. Extracts from Speech of Earl of Carlisle at his first audience, February 11, 1664 o.s. (pp. 164-169).]

His most serene Majesty, my most gracious Lord and Master, hath lately received from your Imperial Majesty a most honourable embassage, the splendour of which as it was most worthy the magnificence of so great a monarch from whom it proceeded, so the subject was most acceptable to whom it was directed. For as much as it contained, together with the most welcome news of the health and prosperity of your Imperial Majesty, your joy of his happy restauration to his kingdoms, your memory of the ancient friendship betwixt the glorious predecessors of both your Majesties and your own most constant resolution to continue and increase the same for the future. . . . His friends as it is usual most of them failed, and when it seemed that heaven and earth had conspired his ruine while they were but contriving his happiness, he was then not only readily assisted by your Imperial Majesty, but the addresses of the



usurpers rejected, and your protection withdrawn from all who might seem any way tainted with the infection of that disloyaltie. And therefore his most serene Majesty, as he hath readily repayed into the hands of your Imperial Ambassador those sums with which you did then pleasure him, so will he always retain deposited in the most sacred recess of his royal heart, and transmit to his successors the memory of all these obligations. . . .

[Second Audience, February 13, 1664. (pp. 189-191.)]

Whereas the first foundation of that happy correspondence and great amity betwixt the kings of England and Emperours of Russia, was laid in the privileges granted to the English merchants by the said Emperours of Russia, in regard of the trade first introduced by them by the way of Archangel, whereby not only the subjects of both countries, and of this country especially, have reaped great advantages: but also both princes, and particularly the Emperours of Russia, in several great affaires of state and otherwise have had further occasion to receive great assistance and effectual testimonies of friendship from one another. His Majestie of England desiring not only to equalize but to excel all his predecessors in the firmness and strictness of his brotherly amity and intire correspondence with his Imperial Majestie . . . hath therefore commanded me, as I do in his name, first of all to desire restitution of the former privileges as they were enjoyed in the time of the father of his Imperial Majestie, and in the reign of his present Imperial Majestie, before the taking of them away upon the occasion of the late rebellion in England. And these being first granted, his Majestie will further manifest

by me the great affection which he bears to his Imperial Majestie.

[pp. 193-194.]

Their answer to the second paper concerning the priviledges of the English Company was no less unreasonable, they refused them under the following pretences, which they alledge for good and solid reasons. First of all they say, the priviledges were abolished upon occasion of the late rebellion of England, and that the English Company of Archangel was guilty of it. . . . Afterwards they lay an hainous charge against the said Company: as that they had not furnished the Tzar's treasury with their commodities, at the same price they were sold for in England, that they had sold prohibited commodities as tobacco and that besides they offered to take strangers goods to carry them through the country customs free. Lastly they speak of a general complaint made by the Russes, merchants and tradesmen, as if the English merchants had all the trade themselves, and grew thereby very rich in a short time, whereas his Tzarskoy Majestie's subjects grew poorer every day. They alleadge also that the merchants who were first nominated for the priviledges were dead, so that (it seemes) they will have the priviledges dy with them.

[Offer of mediation between Czar and King of Poland. June 1, 1664, pp. 286-287.]

His most serene Majesty my master desiring to fulfil all parts of a most sincere brotherly affection towards his serene Tzarskoy Majesty, according to his promise in his former royal letters, and by me his extraordinary ambas-

sador, taking into consideration the present war continued betwixt his Tzarskoy Majesty and the King of Poland, to the so great detriment of the common Christian interest, hath therefore, although he knowes that his Tzarskoy Majesty doth neither want sufficient forces nor most prudent counsels, whereby he may probably bring that war to a conclusion, yet for the better facilitating of a firme and honourable peace betwixt his Tzarskoy Majesty and the King of Poland impowered me, if it may be acceptable and desirable to his Tzarskoy Majesty, to offer his mediation toward so good a work, and hath therefore, laid aside all respects to the contrary, believing that so laudable a design will so much the rather find with his Majesty of Poland all effect and acceptance. And this being but as an earnest of all those other counsels and good offices, which his Tzarskoy Majesty may promise himself continually from his Royal Majesty, I do no ways doubt, but his Tzarskoy Majesty will manifest a just value of his Royal Majestie's most sincere and constant brotherly affection.\*

\* This offer of mediation was not accepted, and Carlisle left Moscow shortly after.

## B.—THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA.

[Mr. Whitworth, the English envoy at St. Petersburg, to the Right Hon. Mr. Secretary Harley, March 7, 1705. Collection (Sbornik) of the Russian Imperial Historical Society, xxxix, 45 ff.]

### I

#### *Grievances of the Merchants.*

The greatest hardships whereof the merchants complain, are of a very late date, most of them being introduced within these three last years ; nor have they any security against further innovations, their trade being not authorised by any public or settled rules, but only carried on by a bare toleration, and therefore liable to such sudden alterations as the Czar's ministers think fit, who, by what I can observe, seem to consider more any little present gain now the Czar is in want of ready money for his armies, than the real and lasting advantage of their country.

The chief grievances are :

1. The forcing or enticing seamen out of the English merchant-ships at Archangel.
2. The granting several monopolies to private persons, whereby the rest are wholly excluded from purchasing the best commodities of the country.
3. The obligation to exchange a certain parcel of dollars at a very disadvantageous rate against the currant coin of

the country, in proportion to the hemp they buy up; which is now impracticable, since the export of those dollars from Holland and Hamburg is forbid.

4. The exacting half a dollar *pro* tun from every ship under the name of buoy and light money; notwithstanding the very great rates, which they must likewise pay for anchorage and pilotage.

5. The taking several great guns out of the merchant-ships without returning them or making any satisfaction.

6. The prohibition of selling their goods till the Czar's magazines are furnished, whereby they often lose the market or must dispose of them to the Czar's officers at underrates.

7. The want of good pilots at Archangel and long detaining their ships before the fort exposes them to great hazards.

8. The want of public officers to inspect and vouch the plan, gives opportunity to great abuses.

9. They desire more warehouses may be appointed to receive their goods.

The hardships, which the tobacco-company lye under, are still greater, and the injustice done them in several instances is but too apparent; but the only remedies, which are left to propose in their favour, are:

1. Time to sell the tobacco remaining in their hands, which is a third part of their whole importation.

2. A liberty of trading therewith in all the Czar's dominion's, none excepted.

3. Free permission to buy up all sort of commodities, whatsoever; and,

4. To export the same custom-free and not to be liable to vexatious retrospections on that account.

[NOTE.—England gave way on the subject of recalling English shipwrights, but refused Peter's request to divert trade to the Baltic because its ports were blockaded by Sweden.]

## II

[Whitworth to Harley, January 23, 1706. Sbornik, 39, 222 sq. Discusses the chances of successful mediation in the war between Russia and Sweden and the terms likely to be accepted by the belligerents.]

*Extract.*

. . . Thus I cannot learn that there are any terms which may reciprocally content the Czar and the Swede in the posture their affairs now are ; the one is resolved to keep Petersburg, and before the last extremity the other will scarce allow him that or any other port on the Baltic, whither the greatest part of the trade and revenues in Livonia would soon be drawn away.

Nor can I pretend to judge how far it may be the interest of England and Holland to let the Czar into the affairs and trade of Europe by this door? At least I know several of the Swedish ministers think you will never consent to such an establishment and this opinion has partly caused the fatal neglect of that province, which they imagine, whatever may happen, their neighbours will be one day bound to recover for them. The Czar himself seems apprehensive of this maxim, which probably makes him so uneasy at the news of any advantage gained over the French by the Allies, who, if the war draws out in length or proves unsuccessfull, he fancies will scarce have the convenience of observing or stopping his progress in the north.

The king of Poland has this notion likewise, and has sometimes sounded me himself or by his ministers if the English were not jealous of the Czar's footing on the East Sea, which discourse I always endeavoured to divert, not thinking it proper to explain myself by any answer in the present posture of affairs.

Should however the English interest demand the exclusion of the Russian power from the East Sea, it is still to be considered what methods for obtaining this end may be most effectual and least invidious. Should England and Holland instead of being mediators pretend to act as arbitrators and by their authority put an end on such conditions, as they should think most reasonable and convenient, the ruin of the merchants and the entire loss of commerce in these parts must be infallibly expected; which, though at present it be of little advantage to the private persons concerned, and still less to the public, yet may one day prove a very considerable branch of the English trade if the change of customs and habits in this country comes to be perfectly established. The king of Prussia has no such interest to manage and therefore may appear more openly if encouraged by the Allies, and the extent of his several coasts on the Baltic obliges him to take care that no formidable power encroaches on that sea. The king and republic of Poland may be likewise brought to make the same reflexions: but the king of Denmark, as is perceivable by his envoy's discourses, has other views, and wishes the Czar's forces may spread and settle in those parts, which then would always be a ready and strong assistance against the Swedes both by sea and land and perhaps make it more difficult for England and Holland to hold the balance, as they have hitherto done between those

two kingdoms. And though you will have seen in my letter of the  $\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>9</sup> May 1705 that the Czar was willing to give Her Majesty all positive assurances he would never have a fleet or men of war on the East Sea, yet if he should be once quiet master of that part and have time to get a good fleet ready in the lake of Ladoga, the temptation would be great to break his word, especially if he was encouraged by Denmark, or saw any favourable occasion.

### III

[Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Empire of Russia and the Crown of Great Britain, concluded at St. Petersburg, December 2, 1734. (French.) *Supplément au corps universel diplomatique de Dumont*. Ed. Rousset, ii., pt. ii., pp. 495-498. This is the first formal treaty between the two countries.]

#### *Extracts.*

*Art. 3.*—It is agreed that the subjects of the High Contracting Parties may enter at all times, in all parts, places or towns of any of the High Contracting Parties, with their vessels, ships etc. laden or empty, in which it is permissible for the subjects of any nation to enter, trade or dwell; and the sailors, passengers, and vessels, both Russian and English, although among their crew there be subjects of some other foreign nation, shall be received and treated as the most favoured nation. . . .

*Art. 4.*—It is agreed that the subjects of Great Britain may bring by water or land, into all or any of the states of Russia, where the subjects of any other nation are permitted to trade, all manner of effects or goods, whose trade and entrance is not forbidden. . . . Similarly that the subjects of Russia may bring into all or any of the states of Great



Britain, where the subjects of any other nation are permitted to trade, all manner of goods produced or manufactured in the states of Russia. . . . And in order that equality may be maintained with reference to the exportation of goods and merchandises upon which the Russians pay much less duty than those who traffic there from Great Britain, the subjects of Russia shall in future pay the same export duties as do the English upon the same goods on exportation from the ports of Russia. And the Russian merchants shall enjoy the same liberties and privileges of trade in England, as the English merchants who are of the Russia Company enjoy.

*Art. 8.*— . . . They may likewise bring all manner of goods and merchandise from Persia and transport them across Russia . . . paying only 3% *ad valorem* duty and transit. . . . And in order to prevent all fraud on the part of the English subjects and all vexation and delay on the part of the Russian officers the English merchants shall declare the goods destined to pass through Russia to go to Persia and the same with those that they bring from Persia, at the first place they arrive in Russia.

*Art. 10.*—That the subjects of one or other of the parties shall not pay more customs for the import or export of the goods than what is paid for the import or export of the same goods by the subjects of any other nation. . . .

*Art. 11.*—It is agreed that the subjects of one or other of the parties may freely go, come and trade in all states which are or might be hereafter at enmity with any of parties, excepting only the places which are actually blockaded or besieged, provided that they carry no munitions of war to the enemy, with all other goods ; and vessels, passengers and goods shall be free and without hindrance.

*Art. 13.*—That in case of a rupture between the High Contracting Parties, which God forbid, the persons, goods and vessels of the subjects of one or other of the parties, shall not be detained nor confiscated, but there shall be at least a year allowed them so that they may sell, dispose, carry or send away their goods and transport their persons.

*Art. 17.*—Passeports shall be granted to all English subjects who desire to leave Russia, two months after they shall have given notice of their intention to depart, without compelling them to give any security, if during this time there appears no just cause for their detention, or without compelling them to apply elsewhere than to the College of Commerce or to what shall be substituted for the College of Commerce for their passports. The same expedition and facility to depart shall be given to Russian subjects, in all the states of Great Britain, according to the usage of the country on such occasion.

*Art. 19.*—All the affairs of the English merchants in Russia shall be under the cognisance of the College of Commerce only, or such other court as may be appointed hereafter, instead of this college, to take cognisance of the affairs of merchant strangers and no other. Russian merchants, in the states of Great Britain shall be under the protection and justice of the laws of this kingdom, like all other merchant strangers, and shall be treated as the most favoured nation.

*Art. 30.*— . . . the said High Contracting Parties have agreed that the treaty shall endure for fifteen years, from the day of the signature of the present treaty and before the term has expired they may agree together, to renew and prolong it.

## IV

[Instructions to Mr. Ed. Finch, Minister Plenipotentiary, March 18, 1740. (Sbornik, 85, p. 7*sq*).]

And whereas we are informed, that the *Sieur Chétardie* has been lately sent to Petersburg, in quality of ambassador extraordinary from the French king to the Czarinna you will make it your business to watch the proceedings of that minister particularly, and endeavour to discover what overtures or propositions he may from time to time make to the ministers of that princess, what negotiations he may be charged with, and what encouragement he may meet with therein. . . . And as it may, in that case, be necessary to shew and convince the Russian ministers of the real intentions of France towards the Czarinna, and how little cause they can ever have to rely on any professions of friendship on the part of the said crown, you will in the utmost confidence acquaint them with the certain intelligences, of which we have ordered that an account should be given you, of the present pernicious intrigues which are at this time carrying on by the French ministers in Sweden, Denmark and Prussia, in order to encourage those courts to join in making war upon Her Czarish Majesty.

[Private and additional instructions.]

Upon your arrival therefore at the Czarinna's court, your first and chief care shall be to inform yourself by that princess's ministers . . . of her intentions as to the prosecution of the negotiation,<sup>1</sup> so unhappily delayed and interrupted by means of the Turkish war, and since, by

<sup>1</sup> For a treaty of mutual defence finally concluded in 1742.

the death of our late resident (Mr. Claudius Rondeau), either upon the plan delivered by him, or in any other shape, and you shall acquaint them, that as our sincere desire of cultivating the most intimate friendship with Her Czarish Majesty for our mutual defence and for the general good of Europe, and of fortifying the same by the strictest ties of alliance, does still continue, so we cannot in the least doubt your finding Her said Majesty in the like favourable dispositions and have therefore sent you, expressly to put the finishing hand to that affair, whereof we so earnestly wish the conclusion, and that you are accordingly ready to enter immediately with them into the negotiation of it, and to sign the treaty when concluded, having all necessary instructions and our full powers for that purpose, and being fully apprised of what has already passed on it, and informed of our intentions.

## V

[Treaty between his Britannick Majesty and her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias. Together with the four separate articles belonging thereto. Signed at Moscow, December 11, 1742. (A Collection of all the Treaties of Peace, Alliance, and Commerce between Great Britain and other Powers, etc., by Rt. Hon. Chas. Jenkinson. London, 1785. Vol. iii., pp. 37-47.)]

Whereas the most serene etc. Lord, George II., King of Gt. Britain etc. and the most serene Lady, Elizabeth Petrowna, Empress and sole monarch of all the Russias etc. have considered, how useful and salutary it might be to their respective states and subjects, and also how much it might contribute to the maintaining of the general tranquillity of Europe, and of that of the north in par-

ticular, not only to cultivate by all manner of good offices, as they have done hitherto, a strict union between themselves, but also to extend the obligations of their friendship, and to render it more effectual, and more applicable to the cases that might happen, by providing for their reciprocal security by a treaty of defensive alliance . . . have agreed upon the following articles:

I. There shall be, for ever, between His Majesty the King etc. and Her Majesty the Empress etc. . . . everywhere, as well by sea, as by land, a faithful, firm and perpetual friendship, alliance and union; and they shall on the one side, and on the other, be so far from doing any injury or damage to each other, that they shall exert themselves in promoting their mutual interests, and in maintaining each other, reciprocally in the kingdoms etc. . . . which they have possessed of before the year 1741, or which they may acquire by treaties.

II. For this purpose it is agreed, that, if, in times to come, their said majesties, or either of them, should be attacked by sea or land, by whomsoever it be, they shall lend each other, immediately after requisition, the necessary succours; which shall be determined, as well with regard to the nature, as to the quantity, according to what is hereafter stipulated in the following articles of this treaty. . . .

IV. As the principal design and end of this alliance is, mutually to secure one another from all invasion, injury and damage . . . and as the natural strength of Great Britain principally consists in ships of war, and that of Russia, in land forces; it is agreed, that, in case H.B.M. should be attacked or disturbed in his kingdoms, etc., Her I.M. of all the Russias will send him forthwith 10,000

infantry, and 2,000 cavalry; which succours shall be continued to him, on the part of H.I.M., during the whole time that the said attack or disturbance shall last; and, on the other hand, in case H.I.M. etc., should be attacked or disturbed in her kingdoms, etc. . . . H.B.M. will send her forthwith a squadron of 12 men-of-war of the line carrying 700 guns and 4,560 men. This squadron shall be duly fitted out, and armed for war, which succour shall be, in like manner, continued to her, during the whole time the said attack or disturbance shall last. . . .

XV. It is agreed, that the case of this treaty of alliance shall not be extended to the wars which may happen to arise between H.I.M. etc. and the Ottoman Porte or the Persians, Tartars or other Eastern nations; . . . as in like manner, on the other side H.I.M. etc. shall not be obliged to furnish the succours stipulated by this treaty, for the defence of H.B.M.'s possessions in America, or in any part whatsoever out of Europe. [By the next article this exception is also applied to Spain, Portugal and Italy.]

[*Art. 21.*—fixes alliance for fifteen years. First separate article confirms treaty of commerce of 1734 and prolongs it for the same time as the treaty of alliance. Second separate article agrees to invite Elector of Saxony to adhere to foregoing treaty. Third separate article provides for admission of Prussia and the Low Countries into the alliance. By fourth separate article His B.M. acknowledges the Empress “and her successors in the Imperial throne of Russia, and to give them the title thereof.”]

## VI

[Extract from the instructions to Rt. Hon. Lord Tyrawley on appointment as British Ambassador to the Court of St. Petersburg, November, 1743. Sbornik, vol. cii., pp. 1-13.]

*Private and Additional Instructions.*

2. We have been informed by our minister in Sweden, that there is a disposition there to ask our guaranty to the treaty of peace lately concluded between that kingdom and Russia. In case you should find that the same is desired by the court of St. Petersburg, you will make no difficulty of declaring our readiness to give the Empress that new mark of our friendship, in case a requisition of it be made to us in due form by the two powers concerned.

3. And whereas our trusty and well beloved Sir Cyril Wych has transmitted to us an instrument containing the accession of the Empress of Russia to the treaty concluded the 28th July 1742 between the Queen of Hungary and the King of Prussia at Breslau, (which treaty we have guaranteed) and an acceptance of the said accession, as well on our part, as on that of the said queen and king, we have ratified the said instruments, and ordered our ratification of it to be delivered herewith to you, that you may exchange it against that of the Russian court.

4. . . . We think fit to acquaint you that the principal object we have in view in sending you as our ambassador thither, is to cement as strict a friendship, and union as possible with the Czarina, and to oppose all intrigues, and baffle all the ill designs of France towards us and all allies,

and particularly to assist in removing any ill impressions that may have been made there, by the artifices of that crown, to the prejudice of our good sister, the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, and to endeavour not only to renew the former good understanding between the two courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna, but to procure if possible, in due time, the assistance of the former to the latter or at least to obtain that nothing be done on the part of Russia in opposition to, or in prejudice of the Queen's cause, which the Empress is not only bound by treaty to support, but engaged to do it by the fundamental interest of her Empire, which requires the cultivation of a constant friendship with the House of Austria for their common barrier against the Turk. . . .

6. You are to be particularly attentive to the motions and transactions of the *Sieur de la Chétardie*, ambassador from our good brother the French King to that court, and as the principal point of his instructions is supposed to be the bringing about a triple alliance between Muscovy, France and Sweden, by which means it is hoped by the French ministers that they shall be able to exclude us from all influence in the affairs of the north, and in consequence of it to make themselves masters of the trade to the Baltic, to the great prejudice of our subjects and kingdoms, you shall therefore oppose and thwart to the utmost of your power every insinuation and proposal that may tend to such a mischievous end. . . .

7. And whereas the ministry in Sweden, who, in compliance with the instigations of France, were the authors of the late war against Muscovy, and who have been constantly and equally well indisposed both towards the Empress, are still in power there, you shall use your



endeavours, though it must be done with great caution and management, to induce H.I.M. to make use of the influence, which she has acquired by the success of her arms in Sweden, for removing those persons, and substituting such others in their room, as have given indubitable proofs of their good affections to our common interests.

8. The ministers and agents of France having endeavoured by many inventions to misrepresent our good intentions toward the Empress and towards the great duke, her nephew, and having particularly endeavoured to persuade her that our ministers both at the Hague and at Copenhagen, had acted and declared themselves in a very partial and unfriendly manner with regard to H.I.M.'s interests and views, as those reports were entirely destitute of all foundation, we have ordered to be delivered to you herewith, not only the justification of our said two ministers from their own letters (copies of which have been already given by our order to the Russian minister here), but the copy also of the real instructions upon which they have acted, by which you will be able to confute entirely all such malicious aspersions, and to shew that we were so far from encouraging the King of Denmark to insist upon the election of his son or upon the cession of Holstein, that we did in truth earnestly dissuade him from all violent proceedings and were the cause of his forbearing to begin hostilities, and his having recourse to the way of negotiation.

## VII

[On the eve of the Seven Years' War England and Russia renewed the treaty of 1742, the latter undertaking to send a larger contingent of troops in return for an increased subsidy. Jenkinson, iii. 30-36. September 19/30, 1755.]

(ii.) . . . With this view, Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias has not only caused to march towards the frontiers of Livonia adjoining to Lithuania, but engages also to hold there, as long as this convention shall subsist, as near to those frontiers as the quarters will permit, a body of her troops, amounting to 55,000 men ; that is to say, 40,000 infantry of her regular troops, furnished with the necessary artillery, and 15,000 cavalry.

(iii.) Her I.M. engages, moreover, to cause to be held in readiness, during the time above specified, on the coasts of the above-mentioned province, 40 or 50 gallies, with the necessary crews, in condition to act on the first order.

(iv.) The body of troops and the gallies, . . . shall not be put in activity, but in case His Britannic Majesty or any of his allies, should be attacked ; . . .

(v.) In case the dominions of H.B.M. in Germany should be invaded . . ., H.I.M. declares, that she will look upon such an invasion as a case of the above-said alliance of 1742, and that the said dominions shall be therein comprized in this respect.

(vi.) In consideration of so important an augmentation of the succour stipulated by the treaty of defensive alliance above mentioned, . . . H.B.M. promises and engages to cause to be paid to H.I.M. the sum of £500,000 sterling per annum, to be reckoned from the day when the body of

her troops shall have passed the frontiers of her dominions, in consequence of the requisition made by H.M. the King of Great Britain. . . .

(ix.) In case that, contrary to all expectation, a war should break out, H.B.M. engages to send into the Baltick Sea a squadron of his ships, a force suitable to the circumstances. . . .

(xi.) All the plunder which the Russian troops shall gain from the enemy, of what nature and quality soever, shall be for the advantage of those same troops.

## VIII

[During the war of American Independence England made strenuous efforts for an alliance with Russia. The English Ambassador, Sir J. Harris, wrote home suggesting that "some cession of a nature to increase her (the Empress Catherine) commerce and naval strength" would induce Catherine to give us her assistance. Potemkin had hinted that "the only cession which would satisfy the Empress would be that of Minorca." Lord Stormont, on behalf of the English Government, accepted the proposal. Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, first Earl of Malmesbury, i. 373 *sq.*]

"The Empress of Russia shall effectuate the restoration of peace between Great Britain, France and Spain upon the following terms, viz. : the treaty of Paris in 1762 shall be the basis of the treaty to be made : It shall be renewed with such alterations only, respecting the possessions of the contracting parties, as the events of the war have made ; with regard to all which, the present *uti possidetis* shall be the rule, unless where the parties shall choose to vary it for mutual convenience. . . . If the Empress of Russia will effectuate such a peace as is here described,

the king will, in that case, cede to Her Imperial Majesty, and to the Imperial Crown of Russia, the island of Minorea, this cession to take place as soon as possible after the preliminaries of the above-described peace are signed. A treaty of perpetual defensive alliance between Great Britain and Russia, of which treaty, the cession and guarantee of Minorea shall make a part, and shall be signed on the same day as the above-mentioned preliminaries : though the cession must be conditional, and cannot be made till after the service performed, yet the effectual engagement may be entered into immediately, but must, for many reasons, be kept absolutely secret for the present. When the Empress of Russia takes possession of Minorea . . . she shall also expressly engage that the port and harbours of Minorea, shall, at all times, be open to His Majesty's ships of war, as also to all privateers ; and all ships belonging to His Majesty's trading subjects shall have free entry there, and pay no other duties than the common port duties paid at present. To prevent the danger of a sudden attack upon Minorea during the present war, the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean shall receive orders to be attentive to its protection."

[Catherine, while anxious to obtain Minorea, suspected the *bona fides* of Britain and feared that she would be drawn into war. She therefore gave the following reply to the proposal : Sir Jas. Harris to Stormont, March 9/20, 1781 (*ib.*, 401).]

"Her Imperial Majesty is extremely sensible of the friendly offer the Court of London has made her ; she has already said, and again repeats, that she shall be most happy to contribute to obtain for Great Britain a just and

honourable peace. That she will work strenuously with her colleague (the Emperor) to effect this end; and if she should be fortunate enough to succeed, she then, with the greatest pleasure, will enter into the closest connexion with England, and cement this connexion by any means the most likely to render it useful, sincere and lasting. As long, however, as she is employed as mediatrix, His Britannic Majesty must be sensible she cannot, with any propriety, enter even into an eventual Convention with him, since, as the object of this convention must sooner or later transpire, it will appear on some future day as if she had, during the mediation, been influenced by one of the belligerent powers, and her impartiality and justice might be called in question."

[NOTE.—The proposal of the Mediating Powers was that an armistice should be signed for a year, during which all hostilities were to be suspended and peace negotiated. The American Colonies were to be admitted to this proposal, and no treaty of peace was to be signed without their being included. England rejected these terms.]

## C.—RUSSIA AS A GREAT POWER.

## I

[Bonaparte had seized Malta and expelled the Knights of St. John. The latter elected the Czar, Paul I., as their Grand Master, who now claimed the guardianship of the island. A convention had been drawn up in 1798 between England, Russia and the Two Sicilies governing the combined action of the three Powers. Sir Arthur Paget, the British Envoy at Palermo, contests the claims of the Russian envoy, Italinsky, to land a Russian force in virtue of this agreement. *Paget Papers*, i. 301-2. Palermo, January 7, 1801. (French).]

*Extract.*

If then this convention had for its object the co-operation of the three powers, both for the reduction and the occupation of La Valeta, if during the course of a siege, which for its duration and the efforts of the besiegers is without example, His Britannic Majesty was deprived of the presence of the forces of His Imperial Majesty, though they were within reach to give him all the assistance which could be expected from their bravery and experience, it is notorious that the principal stipulations of the Convention have not been mutually accomplished. The undersigned leaves it to the judgment and candour of the Minister of His Imperial Majesty the power to judge by which of the two powers this glorious task has been undertaken and

achieved. There can therefore be no doubt of the sense of the Convention; it contains two distinct objects: the reduction and occupation of the Island of Malta. The accomplishment of the first gives right to the second.

Imbued with the justice of these observations and whilst awaiting some further arrangement, the undersigned is obliged to express his doubts to Chevalier d'Italinsky, whether British commanders at Malta are provided with the order relating to the commission of General Springporten.

## II

[After the defeat of Anglo-Russian force at Bergen in Holland by the French, August 27, 1800, the Czar Paul I. turned to Napoleon. The two Sovereigns then arranged a scheme for the overthrow of the English in India, and Paul ordered the Don Cossacks to begin their march. "Memoirs of the Ataman Denisof," quoted in A. Rambaud: *History of Russia* (Eng.-trans.) ii. 264-5.]

The English are preparing for an attack by land and sea against me and my allies, the Swedes and the Danes; I am ready to receive them. But it is necessary to be beforehand with them, and to attack them on their most vulnerable point, and on the side where they least expect it. It is 3 months' march from Orenburg to Hindustan, and it takes another month to get from the encampments of the Don to Orenburg, making in all 4 months. To you and your army I confide this expedition. Assemble therefore your men, and begin your march to Orenburg; thence, by whichever of the three routes you prefer, or by all, you will go straight with your artillery to Bokhara, Khiva, and the river Indus, and the English settlements in

India. . . . Prepare everything for the campaign. Send your scouts to reconnoitre and repair the roads. All the treasures of the Indies shall be your recompense. . . . Such an enterprise will cover you with immortal glory, will secure you my good-will in proportion to your services, will load you with riches, give an opening to our commerce, and strike the enemy a mortal blow. . . .

The English possess commercial establishments there, [in India], which they have acquired by means of money, or conquered by force of arms. The object of this campaign is to ruin these establishments, to free the oppressed Sovereigns, to put them with regard to Russia in the same state of dependence that they now are with regard to the English, and finally to secure for ourselves the commerce of these regions. . . . Be sure to remember that you are only at war with the English, and the friend of all who do not give them help. On your march you will assure men of the friendship of Russia. From the Indus you will go to the Ganges. . . .

### III

[Secret instructions to M. de Novosiltzoff on his mission to London, September 11, 1804. Memoirs of Prince A. Czartoryski, ii. 40-51.]

#### *Extract.*

The most powerful weapon hitherto used by the French, and still threatening the other European States, is the general opinion which France has managed to promulgate, that her cause is the cause of national liberty and prosperity. . . . The good of humanity, the true interest



of the lawful authorities, and the success of the enterprise contemplated by the two Powers, demand that they should deprive France of this formidable system.

Such is the first object as to which I desire to come to an understanding if possible, with the British Government, and you will point out that it must be an absolute condition of an intimate and cordial union between Russia and England. Being repugnant to any reaction, I would wish the two Governments to agree that far from attempting to re-establish old abuses in the countries which will have to be emancipated from the yoke of Buonaparte, they should, on the contrary, be assured of liberties founded on a solid basis.

[Detailed instructions relating to Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and Germany are then set forth.]

The Cabinets of St. Petersburg and St. James will have to come to an understanding on all these points, and also as to the individual and family who might be called upon to reign in France—if the Bourbons, which of them, and what conditions he should be called upon to subscribe to, the most essential of which would be that he should submit to the constitution which would be adopted by the nation. . . .

The Ottoman Empire is another country whose fate will have an influence on that of the rest of Europe. The most intimate concert is necessary between Russia and England with regard to the line of conduct which should be adopted towards Turkey. . . . But if the Porte joined France—if a war and its results rendered the further existence of the Turkish Empire in Europe impossible—the two Powers would regulate among themselves the future fate of the parties concerned.

Among the important points of which you will have to treat with the English Government the most difficult will be that of making it feel the propriety and necessity, at a moment when it would re-establish order and justice in Europe in concert with Russia, also to consent to make some change in its maritime code—the only matter as to which the British Cabinet is not free from reproach, and which enables its enemies to injure it by exasperating the neutral powers. Some concessions on this point not of a character to do any real damage to the commerce of England or to her preponderance on the sea, would destroy the fears and the mistrust of the neutral states and sincerely attach them to Great Britain.

[NOTE.—*Cf.* Alison, “History of Europe,” vi. 667, for Pitt’s reply. Both demands—Malta and the Maritime Code—were refused. Russia ratified the treaty after recording its opinion that the restoration of Malta and the alteration of British Naval policy would be in conformity with the principles of equity and justice.]

#### IV

[Friendly relations continued between England and Russia, but the Czar after his treaty with Napoleon at Tilsit broke with his former allies and issued the following declaration. *Annual Register*, 1807, pp. 761-763, October 20/31, 1807.]

#### *Extract.*

The greater the value the Emperor attached to the friendship of his Britannic Majesty, the greater was his regret at perceiving that that monarch altogether separated himself from him.

Twice has the Emperor taken up arms in which his cause was most directly that of England ; and he solicited

in vain from England a co-operation which her interest required; he desired only that they should effect a diversion. . . .

But what sensibly touched the heart of his Majesty was to perceive that England, contrary to her good faith and the express and precise terms of treaties, troubled at sea the commerce of his subjects. . . . When the two Emperors made peace his Majesty, in spite of his just resentments against England, did not refrain from rendering her service. His Majesty stipulated, even in the very treaty, that he would become mediator between her and France : and finally he offered his mediation to the King of Great Britain. . . . But the British ministry, apparently faithful to that plan which was to loosen and break the bonds which had connected Russia and England, rejected the mediation.

The peace between Russia and France was to prepare a general peace. Then it was that England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she had abandoned herself, but it was to cast upon the north of Europe new fire brands, which were to enkindle and nourish the flames of war, which she did not wish to see extinguished. Her fleets and her troops appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence of which history, so fertile in examples, does not furnish a single example. . . .

The Emperor, wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people in his engagements with the courts of the north, by this act of violence committed in the Baltic which is an enclosed sea, whose tranquillity had been for a long period, and with the privity of the Cabinet of St. James, the subject of reciprocal guarantee, did not dissemble his resentment against England, and announced that he could not remain insensible to it.

His Imperial Majesty, therefore breaks off all communication with England, he recalls the whole of the mission which he has sent thither and no longer chooses to keep with him that of his Britannic Majesty. . .

The Emperor declares, that he annuls, and for ever, every preceding convention between England and Russia. . .

He proclaims anew the principles of the armed neutrality, that monument of the wisdom of the Empress Catherine, and engages never to recede from that system.

He demands of England complete satisfaction to all his subjects, for their just reclamations of vessels and merchandize, detained against the express tenor of treaties concluded in his own reign.

The Emperor engages there shall be no re-establishment of concord between Russia and England, till satisfaction shall have been given to Denmark.

[Promises re-establishment of friendly relations upon satisfaction on all foregoing points.]

## V

7

[In September, 1821, the Czar laid claim to parts of the west coast of America and to the opposite coast of Asia. The British Government contested this claim and from the negotiations that ensued the following convention securing the fishing rights of British subjects resulted. *Annual Register*, lxvii., pp. 64-66.\* February 16/28, 1825.]

### *Extract.*

*Art. I.*—It is agreed that the respective subjects of the high contracting parties shall not be troubled or molested, in any part of the ocean commonly called the Pacific Ocean, either in navigating the same, in fishing therein, or in landing at such parts of the coast as shall not have been

already occupied, in order to trade with the natives under the restrictions and conditions specified in the following articles.

*Art. II.*—In order to prevent the right of navigating and fishing, exercised upon the ocean by the subjects of the high contracting parties, from becoming the pretext for an illicit commerce, it is agreed that the subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall not land at any place where there may be a Russian establishment, without the permission of the governor or commandant; and on the other hand, that Russian subjects shall not land without permission, at any British establishment on the north-west coast. . . .

*Art. V.*—It is moreover agreed, that no establishment shall be formed by either of the two parties within the limits assigned by the two preceding articles to the possessions of the other; consequently British subjects shall not form any establishment either upon the coast, or upon the border of the continent comprised within the limits of the Russian possessions, as designated in the two preceding articles; and in like manner, no establishment shall be formed by Russian subjects beyond the said limits.

*Art. VI.*—It is understood that the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, from whatever quarter they may arrive, whether from the ocean or from the interior of the continent, shall for ever enjoy the right of navigating freely, and without any hindrance whatever, all the rivers and streams which in their course towards the Pacific Ocean may cross the line of demarcation upon the line of coast described in Article III. of the present convention. . . .

*Art. X.*—Every British or Russian vessel navigating the Pacific Ocean, which may be compelled by storms or by accident to take shelter in the ports of the respective

parties, shall be at liberty to refit therein, to provide itself with all necessary stores, and to put to sea again, without paying any other than port and lighthouse dues, which shall be the same as those paid by national vessels. . . .

## VI

[The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi between Russia and Turkey aroused strong apprehension in England for the safety of its Asiatic interests. Russia on her part seemed prepared for all eventualities. Nesselrode to M. S. Vorontsov, Russian Ambassador in London: Vorontsov Archives, xl. 83, January 8/20, 1833.]

Just imagine that our treaty of alliance has raised a serious quarrel for us with France and England. Palmerston wants to avenge himself upon us for the sorry rôle he has played in the affairs of the East. He has hurled a most insolent note at us, to which we have replied in the same manner. I hope that everything will be limited to an exchange of notes and despatches. However everything is possible with men so enraged and so devoid of good sense as those who rule England to-day, for they are guided by revolutionary passions and sympathies and not by the interests and calculations of sane reason. I shall therefore not be sorry to learn that we at all events are busily occupied in placing Sevastopol in a state of defence.

## VII

[Sir G. H. Seymour's Conversations with Emperor Nicholas I., January to April, 1853. Parliamentary Papers, lxxi., Pt. V., pp. 1-26.]

January 11, 1853. At the Palace of the Grand Duchess Helen.

*Extract.*

"You know my feelings," the Emperor said, "with regard to England. . . . It was intended that the two countries should be upon terms of close amity; and I feel sure that this will continue to be the case. . . . There have been very few points upon which we have disagreed; our interests, in fact, are upon almost all questions the same." . . .

"Sir," I observed, "your Majesty has been good enough to charge me with general assurances as to the identity of views between the two Cabinets, but I should be particularly glad that your Majesty should add a few words which may tend to calm the anxiety with regard to the affairs of Turkey, which passing events are so calculated to excite on the part of H.M.'s Government." . . .

He (the Emperor) said: "The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces: the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised. . . . Stay; we have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man: it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made. But, however, this is not the time to speak to you on that matter. . . ."

I therefore said: "Your Majesty says the man is sick: it is very true; but Your Majesty will deign to excuse me if I remark, that it is the part of the generous and strong man to treat with gentleness the sick and feeble man."

*Extract.*

January 22, 1853. In continuation of previous conversation the Emperor said: "If the Turkish Empire falls, it falls to rise no more; and I put it to you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched." . . .

*Sir G. H. Seymour*: "With regard to contingent arrangements, H.M.'s Government, as Your Majesty is well aware, objects as a general rule, to taking engagements upon possible eventualities. . . . If I may be allowed to say so, a great disinclination might be expected in England to disposing by anticipation of the succession of an old friend and ally."

"The rule is a good one," the Emperor replied; . . . "still it is of the greatest importance that we should understand one another, and not allow events to take us by surprise. Now I desire to speak to you as a friend and a *gentleman*; if England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest, it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. . . . For my part, I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there, as proprietor that is to say, for as occupier I do not say." . . .

*Sir G. H. Seymour*: "I can only repeat, Sir, that in my opinion, H.M.'s Government will be indisposed to make certain arrangements connected with the downfall of



Turkey, but it is possible that they may be ready to pledge themselves against certain arrangements which might in that event be attempted."

[Seymour had communicated the foregoing and received a reply from Lord John Russell giving the views of the British Government. He then had another conversation with the Emperor on February 20, 1853.]

*Emperor* : "I think your Government does not well understand my object. I am not so eager about what shall be done when the sick man dies, as I am to determine with England what shall be done upon that event taking place."

*Seymour* : "Allow me to observe, that we have no reason to think that the sick man is dying. Turkey will remain for many a year, unless some unforeseen crisis should occur. It is precisely, Sir, for the avoidance of all circumstances likely to produce such a crisis that H.M.'s Government reckons upon your generous assistance."

"Then," rejoined the Emperor, "I will tell you, that if your Government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your Government must have received incorrect information. I repeat to you that the sick man is dying; and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. I am convinced, if I could hold but ten minutes' conversation with your ministers—with Lord Aberdeen, for instance, who knows me so well, who has full confidence in me, as I have in him. And remember, I do not ask for a Treaty or Protocol; a general understanding is all I require—that between gentlemen is sufficient."

[On February 21, Seymour had a private audience with the Czar, and read him Lord John Russell's despatch

of 9th. They then conversed for an hour and twelve minutes. The Czar repeated his arguments in favour of an understanding with England, and sketched the territorial arrangements, which he considered satisfactory "in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire." The Principalities, Servia and Bulgaria, as independent states under his protection. "As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia: that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession." Seymour replied that England's only interest in Egypt was to secure "a safe and ready communication between British India and the mother country."]

## VIII

[Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to P. Menshikov. Confidential. Pera, May, 1853. Parliamentary Papers, vol. 81, pt. 5, pp. 175-180.]

*Extract.*

If I had occasion to justify myself for taking a step originating in my desire to contribute to the amicable solution of a complicated—not to say menacing—state of things, I would refer to the great principles declared by the Five Powers in the year 1841, in behalf of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But it is more agreeable to me to refer to the frank and confidential communications which have passed at St. Petersburg and at London between our respective Governments on the subject of your Embassy, and to deduce some encouraging hope from those which, bearing

the same stamp, have passed here between your Highness and myself.

It results from the former that the Court of Russia, not less than that which I have the honour to represent, would continue to respect the independence of the Porte, and would desire to see it secure from any agitation which might shake the foundations of its tranquillity.

We were authorised to suppose that the demands of Russia, addressed through you to the Ottoman Government, would be limited to the strict requirements of the affair of the Holy Places of Palestine, and that it did not enter into the views of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to seek any extension of right or of power in this country beyond what was assured to him by the existing Treaties.

With the frankness which at this critical period becomes those who profess to be guided by the same principles, I cannot conceal from you how insurmountable the objections to the voluntary acceptance by the Porte of the first articles of your Project . . . appear to me to be. . . . I bear in mind the modifications which your Highness had previously inserted in them ; . . . but may I be allowed to doubt whether, notwithstanding this moderation, the present wording would not have the effect of virtually transferring from one to the other of the two parties—that is, from the weaker to the stronger—by means of an Act having the force of a Treaty, powers elsewhere reserved to the supreme authority of the state, and thus fetter, for the benefit of a foreign influence, the paramount superintendence of the Sovereign in regard to objects which, in this Empire, notwithstanding their spiritual denominations, bear upon the internal jurisdiction of the Government, and affect the interests—and especially the sympathies—of a

population of more than ten millions of subjects depending in a great measure on their clergy.

## IX

[Prince Menshikov, having failed to obtain his demand for the protection of Greek Christians, took his departure from Constantinople. This alarmed the British Government, who took measures to maintain its position with reference to Turkey. *Ib.*, 215, May 31, 1853. Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.]

### *Extract.*

The departure of P. Menshikov (it took place on 22/5/), followed by the entire Russian mission, is a fact in itself of such grave importance, the military preparations of Russia on the Turkish frontier are upon a scale of such vast magnitude, and the danger which threatens the Porte may be so imminent, that it appears indispensable to take measures for the protection of the Sultan and to aid his Highness in repelling any attack that may be made upon his territory.

I have accordingly to inform your Excellency that by Her Majesty's command the fleet now stationed at Malta is placed at the disposal of your Excellency, and that orders will be sent to Admiral Dundas to conform to the requisitions he may receive from you, and to repair to such place as you may direct in the event of your considering the presence of a British force absolutely essential to the safety of the Turkish Empire. Her Majesty's Government, however, are desirous that your Excellency should distinctly understand that in coming to this determination they by no means intend to depart from the moderate and concili-

atory course which they have always adopted between the Porte and its allies. . . .

A declaration of war by Russia against Turkey, the embarkation of troops at Sevastopol, or any other well-established fact denoting intentions of unmistakeable hostility, would in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government entirely justify your Excellency in sending for the fleet, which however would not pass the Dardanelles except on the express demand of the Sultan.

[NOTE.—The Sultan asked for the assistance of the English and French fleets on October 15, 1853.]

## X

[The Emperor Nicholas had entered into a private correspondence with Queen Victoria on the Turkish question. The latter replied at length and traversed the arguments he had advanced on his behalf. Sir T. Martin: *Life of the Prince Consort*, ii., 530-1. November 14, 1853.]

### *Extract.*

Being heartily anxious, Sire, to discover what could have produced this painful misunderstanding, my attention has been naturally drawn to Art. 7 of the Treaty of Kainardji, and I am bound to say to Your Majesty that after having consulted the persons here best qualified to form a judgment upon the meaning to be attached to this article and after having read and re-read it myself with the utmost desire to be impartial I have arrived at the conviction that this article is not susceptible of the extended meaning which it has been sought to attach to it. All Your Majesty's friends, like myself, feel assured that you would not have abused the power which would on such a construction have been

accorded to you. But a demand of this kind could hardly be conceded by a Sovereign who valued his own independence.

Moreover I will not conceal from Your Majesty the painful impression produced upon me by the occupation of the Principalities. For the last four months this has caused a general commotion in Europe and is calculated to lead to events which I, in common with Your Majesty, should deplore.

But as I know Your Majesty's intentions towards the Porte are friendly and disinterested I have every confidence that you will find means to give expression and effect to them so as to avert the most grave dangers, which, I assure you, all my efforts will be directed to prevent. The impartial attention with which I have followed the causes that have up to this time led to the failure of all attempts at conciliation leaves me with the conviction that there exists no real obstacle which cannot be removed or promptly surmounted with Your Majesty's assistance.

## XI

[On the destruction of the Turkish fleet by the Russians at Sinope, November 30, 1853, the Earl of Clarendon instructed Sir George H. Seymour to point out the consequences of the Russian action. *Eastern Papers*, pt. ii., 323. December 27, 1853.]

The events of the last six months, and the proceedings of the English and French Governments, afford abundant proof of their desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and to effect an honourable settlement of the difference between that Power and the Porte; but the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has greatly erred if it has

mistaken the forbearance for indifference, or has calculated upon any want of firmness in carrying out a policy which those Governments have adopted with a due regard to their own and to European interests. Her Majesty's Government have not abandoned the hope that peace may be re-established, for they are unwilling to believe that any insurmountable obstacle can exist to carrying out the declared objects of Russia in a manner incompatible with the dignity and the independence of the Porte; and it would therefore have been a matter of sincere satisfaction to H. Majesty's Government that the combined fleets should have remained at anchor in the Bosphorus while negotiations were pending. But this has been rendered impossible by the attack on the Turkish squadron at Sinope. The intentions of the English and French Governments, which were long since announced to the Porte, must be firmly and faithfully executed. For this purpose, although with no hostile design against Russia, it is essential that the combined fleets should have the command of the Black Sea; and the necessary instructions have accordingly been addressed to the Ambassadors and Admirals of England and France.

In making known to Count Nesselrode that such instructions have been sent . . . you will inform his Excellency that in order to prevent the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope, the combined fleets will require, and, if necessary, compel Russian ships of war to return to Sevastopol or the nearest port; and it is considered that the Turkish fleet should undertake no aggressive operations by sea so long as matters remain in their present state.

## XII

[On March 7 Nesselrode handed Seymour a memorandum embodying the Emperor's views and urging upon England to dissociate herself from France. Diplomatic relations were suspended February 13, 1854. Clarendon then addressed a formal summons to the Russian Government for the evacuation of the Principalities. February 27, 1854. Parliamentary Papers, Eastern Papers, lxxi., pt. vii., 61.]

*Extract.*

The British Government has for many months anxiously laboured, in conjunction with its allies, to effect a reconciliation of differences between Russia and the Sublime Porte, and it is with the utmost pain that the British Government has come to the conclusion that one last hope alone remains of averting the calamity which has so long impended over Europe.

It rests with the Government of Russia to determine whether that hope shall be realised or extinguished; for the British Government, having exhausted all the efforts of negotiation, is compelled to declare to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, that if Russia should decline to restrict within purely diplomatic limits the discussion in which she has for some time past been engaged with the Sublime Porte, and does not by return of the messenger who is the bearer of my present letter, announce her intention of causing the Russian troops under the orders of Prince Gortchakov to commence their march with a view to recross the Pruth, so that the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia shall be completely evacuated on the 30th of April next, the British Government must consider the refusal or the silence of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg as equivalent to a declaration of war, and will take its measures accordingly.



## XIII

[Mr. Forsyth, a representative of the Indian Government, visited St. Petersburg and had several conversations with the Russian Ministers "regarding the interests of Russia and England in Central Asia." His report to the British Ambassador, Sir A. Buchanan, is in Parliamentary Papers, 1873, Vol. lxxv, pp. 731-2, under date November 2, 1869.]

*Extract.*

On 30th October, I had the honour of an interview with his Excellency Prince Gortchakov, when I presented for perusal a letter from Lord Mayo to myself, in which his Lordship expressed his earnest desire that the most complete *entente cordiale* should be maintained between Russia and England in Asia. . . .

His Excellency entirely reciprocated Lord Mayo's opinion regarding the inadvisability of sending any officer, either English or Russian, to Afghanistan. . . .

His Excellency expressed himself much satisfied with Lord Mayo's assurances, as well as by the assurances given by Lord Clarendon, that the policy pursued in India would be in entire consonance with the wishes of H.M.'s Government in India.

In like manner it was to be understood that the policy enunciated at St. Petersburg was that which ruled the actions of all Russian officers in the remotest parts of the Empire, and if different interpretations were put forth by Consuls or Agents in other parts, they were to be treated as mists which should be blown away. There was not the least intention of interfering with our trade with the countries of Central Asia, and as regards imports into

Russian Turkestan only such duties would be imposed as were necessary to protect Russian manufacturers.

General de Miliutine [Minister of War] and M. de Stremoukov (Director of the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) entered fully into the question of maintaining the independence of the States which intervene between Russia and India. M. Stremoukov very ably explained the idea of a neutral zone, which would include such tracts as Balkh and Kounduz and Badakshan, but seeing that these provinces have become, for more or less long, incorporated with Afghanistan, it was the opinion of General Miliutine, concurred in by M. Stremoukov, that we should accept as Afghanistan all the provinces which Shere Ali now holds. Beyond this limit he should not attempt to exercise any interference or influence, and the good offices of England should be exerted to restrain him from all thought of aggression. Similarly Russia should exercise all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

[NOTE.—Forsyth had a further interview on November 4, and was presented to the Czar, who stated “that there was no intention of further extending the Russian dominions; but it was well known that in the East it is impossible always to stop when and where one wishes.”]

#### XIV

[On February 14, 1884, the Khans of the four tribes of Merv Turkomans took the oath of allegiance to the Czar of Russia. This aroused considerable apprehension in England and in Afghanistan. A voluminous correspondence between the English and Russian Governments ensued, from which the following extracts are taken. Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, vol. lxxxvii., pp. 41 *sq.*

E. Granville to Sir E. Thornton (Ambassador at St. Petersburg), February 29, 1884.]

On the January 7, 1884, I addressed a despatch to Lord A. Loftus, expressing the views of H.M.'s Government upon the Russian proceedings in Central Asia. I said that the apprehensions of the Ameer of Afghanistan had been especially aroused by the reported intention to send a Russian expedition to capture Merv and reduce the Turkoman tribes in those parts. Rumours of such an expedition had reached H.M.'s Government, and though it might be discountenanced and disavowed by the Government of St. Petersburg, it would be unwise, in the face of previous events, not to contemplate the possibility that considerations of self-defence or the necessity of punishing acts of plunder and hostility might eventually give occasion for such an expedition. The Ameer, fearing that the result would be to drive the Turkomans to take refuge in the neighbourhood of Herat, which might bring him into collision with the Russian authorities, had applied for advice to the Government of India. . . .

Prince Gortchakov's reply, (January 21, O.S.) . . .  
"I have told Lord A. Loftus that we had no intention of undertaking an expedition against the Turkomans: . . . but if these turbulent tribes were to take to attacking or plundering us we should be compelled to punish them. . . . We are in any case the first to wish that this punishment, if it becomes necessary, should be inflicted as near as possible to our own frontier. . . . I added that although the eventuality pointed out by Shere Ali is scarcely probable, the Ameer of Cabul can assist in removing the possibility of it, making the Turkomans understand clearly beforehand that if they provoke rigorous measures by acts

of depredation against us they cannot count upon any assistance or protection from him." . . .

On the 12th March, 1875, Count Schouvalov was informed by Lord Derby that the only case in which he could conceive such an advance as probable (*i.e.* in the direction of the Russian possessions) was in the event of any Russian movement tending to the occupation of Merv; he reminded His Excellency of the great importance which the Indian Government attached to that place, and of the danger to good relations that would ensue if it were meddled with.

[On 11th May, Count Schouvalov communicated a note from P. Gortchakov dated the 5th April, which contained a positive assurance that the Emperor had no intention of extending the frontiers of Russia such as they existed in Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara or on the side of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek.]

[Sir E. Thornton to E. Granville. Reports a conversation with the Russian Foreign Minister and sends a copy of a memorandum (April 15) he left with him. *Ib.*, pp. 62-3. April 28, 1884.]

Her M.'s Government have been informed that Russian agents have been sent to Penjdeh to procure the submission of the Salor Turkomans: that another agent had visited Meimeneh, where he still was; and that the Commander-in-Chief was going to Sarakhs to take possession of the lands on the right bank of the river opposite that place, and hand them over to the Merv Turkomans. It was added that he was going south, in the direction of Herat, as far as Toman Aga and Kafir-Kale.

H.M.'s Government hope that it is not true that Russian agents have been sent to the above-mentioned places, or

that the Commander-in-Chief intends to visit places such as Toman Aga and Kafir-Kale, which are in Afghan territory ; they trust that the Imperial Government will instruct their agents to respect Afghan rights, and to abstain from any act which might hinder friendly negotiations.

[NOTE.—To the foregoing the Russian Government replied that many of the statements contained in it were incorrect and that they “will be careful not to interfere in the neighbourhood in question if it is clear that it forms part of Afghan territory.”]

## XV

[On the night between 21st and 22nd October, 1904, the Russian Baltic Fleet under Admiral Rojdestvensky on its way to the Far Eastern theatre of war, attacked the Hull fishing fleet in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, sank one boat, killed two persons, and inflicted damages upon other boats and persons. Correspondence between the Governments followed and an international commission was appointed to investigate the affairs. Parliamentary Papers, 1905., vol. ciii., 377 *sq.*]

Extract from Telegram of Sir C. Hardinge, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to Marquess of Lansdowne. October 24th, 1904:

“Count Lamsdorff, on whom I called this morning, . . . stated that the only information he had received was that conveyed in the press telegrams. I impressed on his Excellency the extreme gravity of the situation, saying that if the facts were as reported, English public opinion would be very justly incensed. . . .”

In reply, Count Lamsdorff said that he had been much affected by the news. . . . He could, however, assure me that no action of the nature suggested on the part of their

naval officers would for a moment be tolerated by the Russian Government; that thorough inquiries would be made, and, if any persons were found guilty of such action, adequate punishment would be inflicted on them, and full reparation be made to the sufferers.

[Same to same October 27, 1904 (telegraphic), transmitting report by the Commander of the Baltic squadron at Vigo.]

*Extract.*

The squadron has met many hundreds of fishermen, and has treated them with every consideration except in the case when the fishermen were in the company of foreign torpedo boats, one of which has disappeared, and the other, according to the depositions of the fishermen themselves, remained near them till morning. They took it for a Russian ship, and were indignant that it did not come to the help of the wounded, but it was of foreign nationality, and remained till morning to refind its consort or to repair its damages.

*The Times.* March 10, 1905, p. 5 :

Sir C. Hardinge, the British Ambassador, has presented the Hull fishermen's claims to Count Lamsdorff. They amount to £65,000, which sum the Russian Government agrees to pay.

The fishermen originally claimed more than £100,000, but the British Government, on its own initiative, reduced the amount to the above-mentioned figure.

XVI

[Anglo-Russian agreement respecting Persia. August 31, 1907. Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 34, 1907.]

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations . . . have agreed upon the following terms :

*Art. 1.*—Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc., beyond a line starting from [the limits of the Russian sphere of influence are then defined] and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. . . .

*Art. 2.*—Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions [language of Article 1 is repeated and geographical limits of the English sphere are laid down].

*Art. 3.*—Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles 1 and 2.

[A similar undertaking for the same region by Great Britain in respect of concessions to Russian subjects.]

*Art. 4.*—It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Faristan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the

amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse," up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past. [Similarly the customs revenues of Faristan and the Persian Gulf, etc., are reserved to the service of the loans made to the Persian Government by the Imperial Bank of Persia.]

*Art. 5.*—In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization—the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement—and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue, guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article 1 of the present Agreement; the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas, with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present agreement.

[Agreements of a somewhat similar character relating to Tibet and Afghanistan were also concluded at the same time.]



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE  
CZARS OF RUSSIA FROM THE BEGINNING  
OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN INTERCOURSE

- 1533-84. Ivan IV., the Terrible. } House of Rurik.  
1584-98. Feodor (Theodore). }  
1598-1605. Boris Godunov.  
1605-1613. Period of Troubles (Smutnaya Vremya).  
1613-45. Michael Romanov.  
1645-76. Alexis.  
1676-82. Feodor III.  
1682-89. Ivan V. } Joint Czars until 1689.  
1682-1725. Peter I., the Great. }  
1725-27. Catherine I. (widow of Peter the Great).  
1727-30. Peter II. (grandson of Peter the Great).  
1730-40. Anne (second daughter of Ivan V.).  
1740-41. Ivan VI. (great-nephew of Anne).  
1741-62. Elizabeth (daughter of Peter the Great).  
1762. Peter III. (nephew of Elizabeth).  
1762-96. Catherine II. (wife of Peter III.).  
1796-1801. Paul I.  
1801-25. Alexander I.  
1825-55. Nicholas I. (brother of Alexander I.).  
1855-81. Alexander II.  
1881-94. Alexander III.  
1894-1917. Nicholas II.

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